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CARRYING THE SECOND AMENDMENT OUTSIDE
OF THE HOME: A CRITIQUE OF THE THIRD
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN DRAKE V. FILKO
Ryan Notarangelo +
“The great object is, that every man be armed. . . . Every one who is able may
have a gun.” 1 Today, some Americans might attribute these words to powerful
pro-gun lobby organizations like the National Rifle Association (NRA). 2
However, Patrick Henry, a colonial statesman, revolutionary colonel, and the
first governor of Virginia, said them over two centuries ago. 3 Undoubtedly,
events such as the horrific gun massacres in Aurora, Colorado and Newtown,
Connecticut, 4 the failed Manchin-Toomey Senate proposal on federal gun
regulations, 5 and the acquittal of George Zimmerman 6 illustrate America’s
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The
author is grateful to the Catholic University Law Review for their wonderful work preparing this
paper for publication.
1. Patrick Henry, The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General
Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787 386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
2. See Brian Palmer, Why Is the NRA So Powerful? How the Gun Lobby Leverages Modest
Resources into Outsized Influence, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2012, 3:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/06/eric_holder_charged_with_contempt_how_did_the
_nra_swing_the_votes_of_so_many_democrats_.html (discussing the NRA’s founding and
influence in the United States).
3. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 74 (2d ed. 1994).
4. See Keith Coffman, Colorado Wrestles with Gun Control One Year After Theater
Shooting, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 20, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-0720/news/sns-rt-us-usa-denver-shooting-20130720_1_colorado-movie-theater-theater-shootingjames-holmes (noting that Colorado passed stricter gun regulations after the Aurora shooting); see
also 20 Children Among Dead in Connecticut School Massacre, CBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012, 10:58
AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/20-children-among-dead-in-connecticut-school-massacre1.1134782 (reporting the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, which left twenty children
dead).
5. See Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background Checks, CNN
(Apr. 18, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote. The
Senate also reviewed a ban on assault weapons, but none of the regulations mustered enough
political support on either side. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Party-Line Vote in Senate Panel for
Ban on Assault Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/03/15/us/politics/panel-approves-reinstatement-of-assault-weaponsban.html?ref=guncontrol&_r=1& (noting that, although an assault weapons ban was passed in
committee, it was extremely unlikely to be passed by the whole Congress); see also, US Gun
Debate: Guns in Number, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldus-canada-20759139 (listing President Obama’s wide-ranging gun control proposals).
6. Greg Botelho & Holly Yan, George Zimmerman Found Not Guilty of Murder in Trayvon
Martin’s Death, CNN (July 14, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/justice/
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continuous struggle for harmony between workable gun regulations and the
preservation of gun rights. 7 At the center of this emotionally charged
controversy is the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” 8 In District of Columbia v. Heller, 9 the Supreme
Court of the United States attempted to clarify, in part, the meaning of the
Second Amendment. 10 Limited by the facts of Heller, the Court held that the

zimmerman-trial/. After Zimmerman’s trial and acquittal, some Americans pushed for a national
debate on gun control, violence, and the Second Amendment with particular focus on stand-yourground laws. The Editorial Board, Editorial, Lax Gun Laws vs. Trayvon Martin’s Life: Our View,
USA TODAY (July 16, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/
16/trayvon-martin-george-zimmerman-gun-laws-editorials-debates/2523159/ (arguing that standyour-ground laws and less stringent gun laws are the result of absurd gun lobbying). Thousands
rallied across the United States against such laws. Tom Watkins, Nationwide Rallies Demand
‘Justice for Trayvon’, CNN (July 20, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/20/us/trayvonday/index.html.
7. See Jaime Fuller, It’s Been 20 Years Since the Brady Bill Passed. Here Are 11 Ways Gun
Politics Have Changed, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2014/02/28/its-been-20-years-since-the-brady-law-passed-how-have-gun-politicschanged/ (noting that in 2013, forty-eight percent of Americans thought it was more important to
protect gun rights than to regulate gun ownership); see also Taylor Kate Brown, What’s Behind
Growing Gun Rights Support in the US?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014, 5:42 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30485978 (finding that support for gun rights increased again
in 2014 from 2013). Even Starbucks steamed into the frothy gun debate: “The coffee chain
Starbucks has asked its customers in the US to stop bringing guns into its outlets.” See Starbucks
Asks Customers Not to Bring Guns into Outlets, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 5:44 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24142085; see also Chipotle Asks Customers Not to Bring
Guns into Restaurants, BBC NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:43 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-27492193 (resulting from an incident in Texas, where several customers brought assaultlike rifles into Chipotle restaurants).
Political discussions on the gun debate are sometimes career-ending, too. During a recent
recall election in Colorado, the president of the state senate was ousted after supporting stricter gun
regulations. See Colorado Voters Sack Gun-Control Democrats, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:32
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24055400.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
10. Id. at 592 (stating the Second Amendment confers the right to carry a firearm for
protection). The confusion surrounded the right’s scope. Two schools of interpretation, one
supporting the individual right to bear arms and the other supporting the collective right, claimed
to unlock the true meaning of the Second Amendment’s twenty-seven words. See DAVID C.
WILLIAMS, THE MYSTIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL
VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 15 (2003); see also Margaret E. Sprunger, Comment,
D.C. As a Breeding Ground for the Next Second Amendment Test Case: The Conflict Within the
U.S. Attorney’s Office, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 581–83 (2004) (discussing the two schools of
Second Amendment interpretation). However, a third school viewed the Second Amendment as a
civic duty rather than an individual or collective right. See, e.g., 1 GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT xv (Robert Cottrol
ed., 1993). The individual rights school interpreted the Second Amendment as securing an
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Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense inside the home. 11 Two years later, in 2010, the Supreme Court
further held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated to the states the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 12 After Heller,
the Second Amendment unequivocally protects a right to bear arms for selfdefense inside the home. However, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stated: “[T]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether
the Second Amendment creates a right of self-defense outside the home.” 13
According to Heller, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined by
its historical origins and its plain language. 14 The history of the right to bear
arms originated within the context of the English Civil War and its aftermath. 15
Shortly after the English Civil War, the English Parliament secured the English
Bill of Rights. 16 In that charter, the Parliament stated that certain subjects of the
Crown had the right to armed self-defense. 17 However, in colonial America
armed self-defense was more pressing a need than in England because Native
Americans and other European countries threatened the colonists’ security. 18
Eventually, the notion of armed self-defense for protection from hostile
Native Americans transitioned to armed self-preservation from a tyrannical

individual right to bear and keep arms, while the collective right school read the Amendment to
protect the right to bear and keep arms only for militia use. WILLIAMS, supra, at 15–16.
11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
12. McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (“[W]e hold that the Second
Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”).
13. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Iyen Acosta, Note, Doe v.
Wilmington Housing Authority: The Common Area Caveat as a Paradigmatic Balance Between
Tenant Safety and Second Amendment Rights, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1113, 1136 (2013) (discussing
the courts’ reluctance to make a determination regarding extending Second Amendment rights
outside the home, because the Supreme Court did not make that determination in Heller).
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (noting that these two considerations decide the scope of the right
to bear arms).
15. Id. at 591–95; see ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 13–14 (2001) (discussing the history of the right to bear arms); see
also Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH.
U. L. REV. 53, 58–59 (1967) (same).
16. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593; SPITZER, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that the English Bill of
Rights was enacted as a reaction to James II’s rule).
17. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94; see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 11 (2008) (“[T]he English Bill of Rights of
1689, declared certain ‘true, ancient and indubitable rights,’ including: ‘That the Subjects which
are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by
Law.’”); SPITZER, supra note 15, at 14–15 (stating that the English Bill of Rights law regarding the
right to bear arms applied “only to nobility, wealthy landowners, and members of the militia
executing their duty to defend the country”).
18. SPITZER, supra note 15, at 13 (acknowledging that the colonies faced a multitude of
varying threats during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).

238

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:235

government. 19 The colonists were successful in the Revolutionary War because,
in part, most owned private arms. 20 After the Revolutionary War, Americans
feared that the new federal government would take away their rights in the same
manner as the previous government. 21 The Framers, seeking to preserve
individual rights, ratified the American Bill of Rights, thereby enshrining the
right to bear and keep arms for self-defense. 22
Though preserved centuries ago, this right to keep and bear arms was not well
understood in pre-Heller America. 23 In fact, Heller elucidated the Second
Amendment’s meaning and held that, at its core, the Second Amendment
protected an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of
self-defense. 24 However, the Court did not explicitly comment on the scope of
the Second Amendment outside of the home. 25 Although lower federal courts
have examined this particular aspect of the Second Amendment without clear
guidance from the nation’s highest court, their opinions are scattered like
birdshot on a silhouette target. 26 Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko, 27 considered the Second Amendment’s rights
outside of the home and rebuffed a challenge to New Jersey’s “justifiable need”
requirement for the issuance of a firearm carry permit. 28 The court declined to
decide whether the Second Amendment protected a right to bear arms outside
the home. 29 Instead, it simply assumed that the Second Amendment applied
19. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95 (discussing the threats the colonists faced from the
British); see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 13–14 (noting that, as Plato and Aristotle taught,
“an armed populace means polity and direct democracy”).
20. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION 44–45 (1989) (stating that colonial law required nearly all
households to have firearms).
21. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594–95; HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 181 (asserting that some feared
congressional control of the militia would turn the militia into a dangerous group).
22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 601–02; see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 305 (elucidating the
Framers’ intent with regards to the Second Amendment).
23. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT ix (1994); see also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
24. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see also McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026
(2010) (noting the Court’s holding in Heller).
25. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that
Heller did not discuss the Second Amendment right outside of the home), aff’d sub nom. Kachalsky
v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013).
26. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the “amendment
confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside”);
but see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (assuming arguendo that the Second
Amendment protects a right outside of the home, but upholding the gun restrictions based on
means-end scrutiny), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
27. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
28. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429–30 (concluding that the “justifiable need” requirement is a
longstanding prohibition on Second Amendment protections and, thus, presumptively valid under
the Second Amendment).
29. Id. at 440 (focusing on the regulations’ failure to burden Second Amendment rights).
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outside of the home, 30 and held that the requirement of a “justifiable need” to
bear arms outside of the home did not violate the Second Amendment’s core
protection of self-defense. 31
This Note discusses why Drake v. Filko is inconsistent with the Second
Amendment as interpreted in Heller. Beginning with an analysis of the history
and text of the Second Amendment, from its English roots to its meaning
throughout both the Framers’ era and the post-ratification period, this Note then
turns to the Supreme Court’s application of the Second Amendment in Heller
and McDonald v. Chicago, 32 noting the ramifications of each with regard to
carrying firearms for the lawful purpose of self-defense outside of the home. 33
Next, this Note addresses the federal circuit courts’ varying approaches to the
issue of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a firearm for
the lawful purpose of self-defense outside of the home, with a particular focus
on the Drake decision. 34 Finally, this Note proposes that Drake’s dissent,
coupled with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’
decisions, is the proper interpretation of the Second Amendment’s protections.
In light of the text and history of the Second Amendment and Supreme Court
precedent, the Second Amendment protects a right to lawful armed self-defense,
both inside and outside of the home.
I. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT: SEEDS SOWN BY ENGLISH HANDS BUT GROWN
ON AMERICAN SOIL
Throughout the twentieth century, the rights now guaranteed by the Second
Amendment were a mystery—their dark grey shadow only seen through an

30. Id. at 431 (“Assuming that the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms does
apply beyond the home . . . .”).
31. See id. at 440.
32. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
33. This Note does not address the applicable level of judicial scrutiny required when
evaluating the Second Amendment. Nor does it distinguish between concealed and openly-carried
weapons, or address the various sensitive places where an individual may or may not carry a
firearm. Furthermore, it will not consider public policy arguments based on gun violence. See
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (stating that public policy arguments are
inappropriate in analyzing constitutional amendments). Rather, the Note’s focus is only on the
antecedent question: whether the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms has any application
outside of the home for self-defense.
34. There are other areas outside the home in which the Second Amendment might afford its
protections, such as hunting, sport shooting, and target practice. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2009).
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opaque window. 35 Yet, this could not have always been the case. 36 The English
origins of the right to bear arms, its growth in colonial America, and the Framers’
conception of the Second Amendment all support the proposition that the
Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside of the home for the
lawful purpose of self-defense.
A. Carrying Firearms for the Lawful Purpose of Self-Defense Outside of the
Home: A “True, Ancient, and Indubitable Right”
The right to bear arms in England began not as a right, but rather as a duty to
bear arms. 37 During the English Civil War, in the seventeenth century, the duty
to bears arms evolved into a right to be armed. 38 In that war, citizens began to
carry personal weapons for self-defense and armed resistance. 39 As codified in
the English Declaration of Rights in 1689, the right to bear arms for self-defense
was not clearly confined to the walls of the home. 40 Although English history
is not dispositive when interpreting the protections of the Second Amendment,
it provides, as Heller stated, the integral, foundational context that is necessary

35. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J.)
(noting that evaluating Second Amendment protections outside of the home is “a vast terra
incognita”).
36. Heller noted “that the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liberties.”
Heller, 554 U.S. at 605. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (stating that the Framers, who
drafted, discussed, and ratified the Second Amendment, understood its purpose).
37. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 1 (noting the right to bear arms in England grew from a prior
obligation to be armed).
38. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 214–15 (1983).
39. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 31. Under the rule of King Charles II, large groups of
Protestant Englishman were disarmed by force. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93; see also
MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 75–76 (stating that Game Act of 1671 served as a means of arms
control). After the English Civil War, British Parliament recognized the dangers to its power
associated with gun possession by commoners and did not want to allow the King Charles II, a
Catholic, to disarm Protestants while arming Catholics. ANDREW CARLSON, THE ANTIQUATED
RIGHT: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE REPEAL OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 26–27 (2002) (noting that
the Game Act of 1671 allowed landlords to disarm their mostly Catholic tenants). Parliament,
disapproving of James’ actions to arm Catholics, asked William of Orange to become king. Id. at
27.
40. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. In 1689, after the Glorious Revolution, recently enthroned
William called a convention to address the rights of the English people and to secure the rights of
his subjects against any future intrusions by a new king. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 113
(expressing the concerns shared by Englishmen over another tyrannical rule). The Convention
promulgated a Declaration of Rights. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
The Declaration of Rights enumerated the “true, ancient, and indubitable,” MALCOLM,
supra note 23, at 115, rights and liberties of the English people, one of which provided: “That the
Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and
as allowed by Law.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (quoting 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large
441) (internal quotation marks omitted). This right protected an individual right to bear arms for
self-defense, rather than a collective right to bear arms. MALCOLM, supra note 23, at 119–20.
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to understand the adoption and meaning of the Second Amendment. 41 For more
than one hundred years, this English right to bear arms developed in colonial
America and evolved into a fundamental right for the young American
country. 42
B. Disarmed and Alarmed in Colonial America: Privately Possessing
Firearms Outside of the Home for Self-Defense was Essential to American
Triumph over Tyranny in the Revolution
As a result of expanding British military presence, American colonists formed
armed militias. 43 The British, however, seized the arms in an attempt to stifle
these militias. 44 To combat against these seizures, some of the Colonies passed
declarations of rights enshrining the right to bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense. 45 In addition, carrying firearms outside of the home was a vital
component of self-defense against Native Americans, European countries, and

41. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 595; FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 43–44.
42. See Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I):
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self–Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585,
637–38 (2012); see also HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 148–49 (discussing the strong sense of
entitlement to the ability to carry arms in early America); infra Part I.B.
43. HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 59–61. A few years after 1768, the British military
effectively occupied the city of Boston and began disarming the fleeing colonists by requiring them
to turn over arms and ammunition before passing through the city limits. Id. at 59.
44. Kates, supra note 38, at 229. In fact, the Battles of Lexington and Concord at the start of
the Revolutionary War were instigated by such a plan to seize arms and ammunition. Id.
45. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 64. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776 stated: “[T]hat a well-regulated militia, or composed of the body of the people, trained to
arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state . . . .” David T. Hardy, The Rise and
Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
315, 323 (2011) (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights § 13 (1776), available at
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thomas Jefferson proposed that the Virginia Constitution state, “[n]o freeman
shall be debarred the use of arms.” 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1950). The Pennsylvania Declaration of 1776 and Vermont’s Declaration of Rights of 1777
stated “[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State.
. . .” Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 246 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM
G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL
SILENT (2002)) (quoting Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Dec. 12, 1787),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The North Carolina Declaration of Rights stated “‘that the people have a right to
bear arms, for defense of the State.’” HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 64 (quoting N.C. Declaration of
Rights, XVII (1776)). These declarations could reasonably be read as an assumption of the
individual right to bear arms outside the home and the expansion of the right for collective use
against tyrannical rule. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 stated: “The people have
a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.” Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy
Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-Heller Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 70 (2013) (quoting MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XVII) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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other individuals. 46 Ultimately, the individual right to bear arms provided
colonists with legal justification and the physical means to fight the British. 47 In
the wake of victory over the British, the American colonists began to build the
new country through the U.S. Constitution. 48
C. Enshrining the Right to Bear Arms for Self-Defense Outside of the Home
through Conventions, the Constitution, the Congress, and the Framers
Shortly after the Revolutionary War, two political parties formed: the
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. 49 Although the two parties disagreed on
the terms of a bill of rights, they both agreed on the importance of an individual’s
right to bear arms for self-defense. 50 When the right to bear arms amendment

46. Kates, supra note 38, at 214–16 (explaining early laws requiring citizens to carry weapons
outside the home).
47. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 58 (recognizing that an important factor in the American
victory in the Revolutionary War was the citizens’ ownership of and experience with weapons).
John Adams, the drafter of the Massachusetts Declaration, “wrote that ‘arms in the hands of citizens
[may] be used at individual discretion . . . in private self-defence.’” Id. at 65 (alterations in original).
48. See Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1781 (2012) (stating that the Founders replaced the Articles of
Confederation with the Constitution to, inter alia, enumerate the “federal-state division” over
military powers).
49. See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 65–66. During the ratification process, the states held
conventions to discuss the Constitution. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 603–05
(2008) (highlighting some of the certain state conventions). Anti-Federalists, like John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson, preferred “[a]n armed populace.” See HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 63.
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists feared that without a bill of rights a free-standing army or select
militia would disarm the people. See McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010);
see also CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE
ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 61
(1994) (stating that the First Congress “fear[ed] not of an armed population, but of a disarmed
population”).
Federalists, like Noah Webster, “promised that even without a bill of rights, the American
people would remain armed to such an extent as to be superior to any standing army raised by the
federal government.” HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 68. Philodemos, a prominent constitutional
commentator, pronounced, “[e]very free man has a right to the use of the press, so he has to the use
of his arms.” HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
During the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry rhetorically asked, “[h]ave we the means
of resisting disciplined armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put into the hands of
Congress?” Id. at 73–74 (quoting Patrick Henry, The Debates in the Convention of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787
386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)). This fear led to the enshrinement of the individual right to
bear arms in the Second Amendment. Id. at 74.
50. Kates, supra note 38, at 221 (“The proponents and the opponents of ratification of the
Constitution equally buttressed their conflicting arguments on the universal belief in an armed
citizenry.”).
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was proposed, it underwent several congressional changes 51 before the adoption
of the Second Amendment. 52
Although the Second Amendment does not explicitly state in what manner or
where an individual can bear arms, at the time of its 1791 ratification, it was
understood as protecting a right to bear arms outside of the home. 53 For
example, in 1799 in Philadelphia, Dr. James Reynolds, an Anti-Federalist,
protested the Alien and Sedition Acts. 54 When a Federalist mob rushed
Reynolds for his protestations, he pulled out a pistol that he carried in his
overcoat for self-defense. 55 At his trial for assault with a deadly weapon,
Reynolds’ attorney argued that, in the absence of any laws prohibiting it, “every
man has a right to carry arms who apprehends himself to be in danger.” 56
Reynolds was acquitted on these grounds, thus, suggesting an interpretation of
the Second Amendment that protected an individual’s right to carry a firearm
for self-defense outside of the home. 57
The Framers understood the right to bear arms as a right to carry firearms
outside of the home for self-defense and to protect oneself against tyranny and
despotism. 58 However, the protections of the Second Amendment have been
misunderstood by generations of Americans. 59 The battle over the Second

51. Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2009) (“The
First Congress made the following changes to the text before ratifying it: (1) the reference to ‘well
armed’ in the description of the militia was deleted; (2) the description of the militia as ‘being the
best security of a free country’ was changed to ‘necessary to the security of a free State’; (3) the
language barring compelled military service of those ‘religiously scrupulous of bearing arms’ was
dropped; and (4) the position of the militia language in the Amendment was changed. . . . ”).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. II. Congress responded to state calls for a declaration of rights by
adopting various amendments to the Constitution, which ultimately became the Bill of Rights. See
ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 107–09
(2011) (discussing the hesitancy of some to ratify the Constitution without a Bill of Rights).
Ultimately, Congress adopted the Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
53. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 17, 317 (noting that George Washington carried a gun
for self-protection during his travels).
54. See David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, The Keystone of the Second Amendment: The
Quakers, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Flawed Scholarship of Nathan Kozuskanich, 19
WIDENER L.J. 277, 300 (2010).
55. Id. at 300–01 (stating Pennsylvania law did not prohibit carrying a firearm for personal
protection).
56. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 91 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 92.
58. See supra Part I.C. The right to bear arms was sacred and dear to revolutionary heroes
such as Patrick Henry, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington. HALBROOK,
supra note 17, at 315–17 (discussing the Framers’ interest in firearms).
59. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (summarizing the Framers’ views on firearms).
There were Supreme Court cases concerning the Second Amendment in the antebellum era, but
Heller is the determinative case on the matter. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
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Amendment’s interpretation has continued, while reaching some conclusiveness
nearly two centuries later. 60
II. GUNFIGHTS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN JUDICIAL
CROSSHAIRS
A. Heller & McDonald: Finding that the Core of the Second Amendment is an
Individual Right to Bear Arms for Self-Defense
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 61 the Supreme Court grappled with the
question of whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a
collective right to bear arms. 62 In its first extensive analysis of the Second
Amendment, the Court considered the District of Columbia’s ban on the
possession of operable handguns inside the home. 63 The Court concluded that
to “bear arms” meant to carry a weapon for purposes unrelated to militia
service. 64 According to the Heller Court, the Second Amendment “guarantee[s]

634–35 (2008) (determining that the core of the Second Amendment was, is, and always will be an
individual right to lawful armed self-defense).
60. See infra Part II. Typically, most Second Amendment cases arise from handgun
regulatory schemes. The first set of cases concerns the issuance of permits to purchase handguns.
The second set concerns the issuance of permits to carry a handgun in public. See, e.g., Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014);
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). The issuance of a carry license or permit
begins with an applicant filing an application with an administrator, local official, or sometimes a
law enforcement officer. In some instances, if the administrator approves, the judiciary may review
the permit’s issuance. In the event of a denial, the applicant can appeal the decision to the trial
court.
A permit to purchase is a prerequisite to buy a handgun, while a permit to carry is a
prerequisite to carry a handgun. The statutory schemes vary, but the components are similar. Most
litigation surrounds the restrictive demonstrations required to obtain a permit or license to carry a
handgun in public. For example, New Jersey requires an applicant to show a “justifiable need” to
carry a handgun. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(d) (West 2014))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In New York, the applicant must show a “proper cause” to
carry a handgun in public. Kachalsky v. Cnty of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Maryland requires the applicant
to have a “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun in public. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712
F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety, § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
62. Id. at 579 (asserting that each amendment that refers to “rights of the people . . . .
[U]nambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights”).
63. Id. at 635 (stating that the District’s gun ban case “represents this Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment”).
64. Id. at 584–86 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Court noted that:
[A] most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]:
wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose
. . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with
another person.
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the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 65 In
other words, the Second Amendment’s core is a right to bear arms for the lawful
purpose of self-defense. 66 However, the Court stated that the Second
Amendment right was not unlimited. 67
Though the Second Amendment protects a right of self-defense, the Court said
there can be no doubt about the validity of “longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings.” 68 In addition, the Court rejected any public policy argument against
the Second Amendment right to bear arms based on gun violence statistics
because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain
policy choices off the table.” 69 Ultimately, the Court held that the District’s ban
on operable gun possession in the home violated the Second Amendment’s core
right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 70 However,
limited by the facts of the case before the Court, Heller did not directly address

Id. at 584 (alterations in original) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the textual analysis of
the Second Amendment, the Court asserted that the Second Amendment’s wording infers that it
was a codification of a pre-existing right to bear arms for self-defense. Id. at 594–95. Heller
implicitly assumed that the Second Amendment extends to carrying outside the home. See Moore,
702 F.3d at 935 (noting that Heller’s analysis of the Second Amendment’s history did not speak in
limiting terms); see also Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the
Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2008) (arguing that Heller’s logic applies to carrying
arms both inside and outside the home).
65. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592; see Acosta, supra note 13, at 1122–24 (discussing the Court’s
analysis in Heller).
66. The Court held that the right to bear arms was primarily a right for the purpose of selfdefense, given the historical analysis of the Second Amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599
(stating that the “central component” of the right to bear arms is self-defense); see also id. at 630
(recognizing that bearing arms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense” is constitutional).
Likewise, Heller noted that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second
Amendment right.” Id. at 628.
67. See id. at 595 (explaining that the Second Amendment does not “protect the right of
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to
protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose”).
68. Id. at 626.
69. Id. at 636; but see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 438 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.
Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (stating that the statute would be valid even if the state
could not provide a report to prove its statistical assertions that its gun control law saves lives).
70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see id. at 595 (“[T]he Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms.”). Because the District’s handgun ban extended “to the home[] where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” id. at 628, it violated “the right of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Therefore,
the District of Columbia’s ban on having operable handguns inside the home was found to be
unconstitutional. Id.
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whether the Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms for self-defense
outside of the home. 71
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 72 decided two years after Heller in 2010, the
Supreme Court struck down Chicago’s ban on the possession of handguns inside
the home. 73 The McDonald Court held that the Second Amendment was
applicable to the states through incorporation and “protect[ed] a personal right
to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within
the home.” 74 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed Heller’s holding that the Second
Amendment safeguards the right to bear arms for self-defense. 75 According to
the Court, the core focus of the Second Amendment is the ancient right of selfdefense. 76 Moreover, the right to bear arms for self-defense is a long-established
belief and value of the American people that is not contingent on “controversial
public safety implications.” 77
As in Heller, the Court rejected public policy arguments based on public
safety concerns over increased gun violence, because the Second Amendment
right to bear arms foreclosed any policy considerations. 78 However, the Court
recognized that the Amendment does not afford an unlimited right to carry a gun
for any purpose and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the longstanding
prohibitions listed in Heller. 79 Again, as in Heller, the nature of the facts
in McDonald did not warrant exploration of the Second Amendment’s
protections outside of the home, and the Court did not address that issue. 80

71. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–30 (focusing the Court’s analysis on the applicability of the
gun regulation on the right to self-defense); see also Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether the Second
Amendment creates a right of self-defense outside the home.”).
72. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
73. Id. at 3026.
74. Id. at 3044.
75. Id. at 3026 (reiterating that Heller “held that the Second Amendment protects the right to
keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense”).
76. Id. at 3036 (“Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient
times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central
component’ of the Second Amendment right.” (footnote omitted)). See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628
(summarizing the Court’s historical analysis that recognized the Second Amendment’s codification
of an “inherent right” of self-defense).
77. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045. Even though the early colonial fears about Congress
disarming the people faded, the right to bear arms remained exalted for self-defense. Id. at 3038.
78. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045–46 (noting that “[t]he right to keep and bear arms,
however, is not the only constitutional right that has controversial public safety implications”).
79. Id. at 3047. The longstanding prohibitions listed by Heller are: in sensitive areas, by
felons, and by the mentally ill. Id.
80. Id. at 3088–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Neither submission requires the Court to express
an opinion on whether the Fourteenth Amendment places any limit on the power of States to
regulate possession, use, or carriage of firearms outside the home.”).
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B. The Fight over the Second Amendment Carries on
Current Second Amendment litigation has focused on whether the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to carry a handgun for the purpose of
self-defense outside of the home. 81 These cases generally arise out of the denial
of a carry permit or license to carry handguns outside of the home for the lawful
purpose of self-defense. 82 Though some states restrict a person’s ability to carry
a handgun through a regulatory scheme requiring a demonstration of a particular
need to carry a firearm outside of the home, 83 other states do not employ these
restrictions. 84 The federal courts of appeal have adopted two distinct approaches
to the question of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry
arms extra domum for the purpose of self-defense. 85
The first approach finds that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry
firearms outside of the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 86 The
second approach does not decide whether the Second Amendment protects a
right to carry firearms outside of the home, but first assumes the Second
Amendment’s applicability before applying intermediate scrutiny. 87

81. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging an Illinois
statute that prohibited carrying an easily accessible, loaded firearm); see also Woollard v.
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the lower court determined the Second
Amendment extended outside the home), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). However, the battle
is not only in the courts. The United States House of Representatives has put forth a bill to remedy
at least one problem associated with carrying outside of the home. See National Right-to-Carry
Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 2995, 113th Congress § 2(a) (2013) (proposing that, under certain
circumstances, a person may carry concealed weapons in public).
82. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 427 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake
v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
83. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that
the New York law at issue, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2014) required a
demonstration of a “proper cause”), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806
(2013).
84. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18–12–203(1)(a) (West 2013) that only restricts non-residents).
85. See, e.g., Martinez, 707 F.3d at 1201 (stating that there is no right outside the home);
Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (holding that there is a right to bear arms outside of the home for nonresidents); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881–82 (assuming that there is a right to bear arms outside of the
home); see also Alexander C. Barrett, Taking Aim at Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. REV. 163, 177
(2013) (“[T]he lower courts have had to determine the appropriate analysis themselves, guided by
the Supreme Court’s approach in Heller. The courts have not taken a uniform approach.”).
86. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942 (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has decided that the
amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense,” and that “evidence . . . is consistent with
concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense”).
87. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 881–82 (“[W]e assume that . . . Woollard’s Second Amendment
right is burdened by the good-and-substantial-reason requirement, we further conclude that such
burden is constitutionally permissible.”).
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1. The First Approach: The Second Amendment Protects a Right to Bear
Arms Outside of the Home
In Moore v. Madigan, 88 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed a constitutional challenge to an Illinois statute that prohibited a person
from carrying a handgun outside the home for self-defense. 89 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that the Second Amendment, as interpreted by Heller,
“confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the
home as inside.” 90 Overturning the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that
the right to bear arms included the right to carry arms outside of the home for
the lawful purpose of self-defense. 91
The heart of the Seventh Circuit’s analysis focused on the implications
of Heller for the Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home. 92 First,
the Seventh Circuit stated that, although Heller and McDonald noted that the
right to engage in armed self-defense was strongest inside the home, 93 it did not
follow from this assertion that the need for self-defense was not important
outside of the home. 94 Second, the Seventh Circuit declared that Heller
88. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
89. See id. at 934. The statute provided that “[a] person commits the offense of unlawful use
of weapons when he knowingly . . . [c]arries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about
his person except when on his land or in his own abode, legal dwelling.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2010). Exceptions to the law include police officers, security guards,
target shooters, and persons on their private real property. Moore, 702 F.3d at 934. The issue for
the court was whether carrying guns in public is protected by the Second Amendment; the case did
not concern handgun ownership. Id. at 934, 938.
In a similar case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently
found that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry arms outside of the home for the purpose
of lawful self-defense and struck down the District’s ban on carrying weapons outside of the home.
Palmer v. D.C., No. 1:09-CV-1482 (FJS), 2014 WL 3702854, *7–8 (D.D.C. July 24, 2014) (noting
that the recent Supreme Court decisions mandated such a finding).
90. See id. at 942.
91. In the district court case, Moore v. Madigan, 842 F .Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Ill.), rev’d, 702
F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), plaintiffs moved for a preliminary or permanent injunction enjoining the
enforcement of two Illinois state weapons statutes that prohibit the carrying of loaded and operable
firearms in public. Id. at 1095–96, 1099. The defendant, the attorney general, moved to dismiss.
Id. at 1096. The plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment protects the rights of an individual
to carry firearms in public. Id. at 1098. The district court held that Heller’s narrow holding is that
the Second Amendment only provides an individual right to lawfully bear firearms in the home for
the purpose of self-defense. Id. at 1102. Moreover, the court explained that “[n]either Heller nor
McDonald recognizes a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home.” Id. at 1101.
Because Heller and McDonald addressed the Second Amendment only within the purview of the
home, the court reasoned that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is limited to self-defense
inside the home. See id. at 1102.
92. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935. Discussing Heller, the court stated that it cannot “ignore the
implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the
right to have a gun in one’s home.” Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court continued its analysis of Heller and McDonald by adding that “‘the need
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute’ in the home, but that doesn’t mean it is not
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guaranteed a right to carry in case of confrontation, and, therefore, by
implication, the Second Amendment protected a right to carry outside of the
home because “[c]onfrontations are not limited to the home.” 95
Next, following Heller, the Seventh Circuit considered the text and the history
of the Second Amendment. The court looked to the plain language of the Second
Amendment to uncover its meaning and noted that “bearing arms” would have
been a peculiar and improper phrase to apply only in the home and not outside
of the home. 96 Therefore, the plain language of the Second Amendment, the
Court observed, supported the conclusion that “[a] right to bear arms thus
implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.” 97
Furthermore, the court, aware of Heller’s historical Second Amendment
decision, noted that Heller’s holding was based on a historical analysis of the
Second Amendment and that the lower courts were bound by that
The court stated that although the same historical
determination. 98
circumstances did not exist in the modern world as they did when the Second
Amendment was ratified in 1791, the protections of the Amendment remained
the same in the twenty-first century. 99 The Second Amendment’s core
protection of armed self-defense, the court reasoned, was more likely to be
needed to defend oneself on the streets than in one’s own home. 100 Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit explained that “[t]o confine the right to be armed to the home
[was] to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described
in Heller and McDonald.” 101
Following the Supreme Court’s lead in Heller, the Seventh Circuit again
emphasized that the right to bear arms was not dependent on gun violence
statistics. 102 The Supreme Court removed this policy choice from consideration,
acute outside of the home.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 628 (2008)).
95. Id. at 936; see also id. at 935–36 (stating that “Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second
Amendment right than the right to have a gun in one’s home, as when it says that the amendment
‘guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 592)).
96. Id. at 936.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 937–38 (referencing Heller repeatedly and relying on its analysis and stating “we
are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis because it was central to the Court’s holding
in Heller”).
99. See id. at 936–37 (recognizing the threat of attacks from Native Americans is no longer
present).
100. Id. at 937. There is a stronger self-defense claim in public than in the home. Id. It would
be hard to imagine a woman exercising self-defense more often inside the home than outside, of
the home. She is more vulnerable outside without any protections than behind her closed apartment
doors. Id. Especially, because, as in this case, most murders in Chicago are committed outside of
the home rather than inside. Id.
101. Id. at 937.
102. See id. at 939 (“Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to
make the right to bear arms depend on casualty counts.”).
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and, therefore, the Seventh Circuit stated that, in Second Amendment
jurisprudence, empirical gun violence data was irrelevant. 103 Rather, what
matters is self-defense. 104
The Seventh Circuit accepted limited bans on carrying outside of the home,
focusing on the longstanding bans listed in Heller. 105 However, Moore stated
that a ban cannot apply to either every class of persons or every public place. 106
In addition, because the Illinois statute was not one of the acceptable
longstanding prohibitions, it destroyed the Second Amendment right to bear
arms for self-defense outside of the home. 107
Like the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in Peruta v. San Diego County, 108 held that the Second Amendment protected a
right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense both inside and outside of the
home. 109 In Peruta, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a California statute that required
a concealed carry permit applicant to attest to a good moral character, attend a
training course, and demonstrate a “good cause” to carry a firearm in public. 110
“Good cause,” according to the San Diego County Sheriff, meant a “sufficiently
pressing need for self-protection” compared to the general population. 111 Each
plaintiff was either denied a concealed carry permit by San Diego County for
lacking a “good cause” to carry outside of the home or declined to apply, fearing
that they would not meet the “good cause” requirement. 112 The Peruta court,
relying heavily on Heller’s determination that the core of the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms is self-defense, reiterated that any statute that
infringed on the right to bear arms for self-defense destroyed the Second
103. Id. at 939.
104. See id. at 942.
105. Id. at 940–41.
106. Id. at 940. But the court said there was a justification to restrict the rights of those who
are mentally ill or criminals and in public places like courtrooms, government buildings, or public
schools because these are longstanding prohibitions acknowledged by Heller. Id. at 940–41; see
also id. at 940 (“[A] person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering
those places . . . .”). Moreover, there is nothing that would question the ban of guns for
undocumented aliens, children, and others. Id. at 940–41. However, the court hypothesized that it
is reasonable to condition the right to bear arms outside of the home on a gun safety course or some
other training procedure. See id. at 941 (stating that a person who is not trained in firearms “is a
menace to himself and others”).
107. See People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 326–28 (Ill. 2013) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit
and holding that the Illinois statute discussed in Moore violated the Second Amendment’s right to
carry a firearm outside of the home for the purpose of self-defense).
108. 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
109. Id. at 1166–67 (“Put simply, a law that destroys (rather than merely burdens) a right
central to the Second Amendment must be struck down.” (citing District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008))).
110. Id. at 1148.
111. Id. (stating that “California law delegates to each city and county the power to . . .” define
“good cause”).
112. Id.
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Amendment right. 113 Because the San Diego County’s definition of “good
cause” infringed on the right to bear arms for self-defense, the scheme was
deemed unconstitutional. 114
The Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, determined that Heller’s analytic
approach controls the analysis of Second Amendment rights. 115 First,
like Heller, the Court asked whether the activity fell within the scope of the
Second Amendment’s protection. 116 To determine whether the Second
Amendment protected a right to bear arms outside of the home, the Ninth Circuit
consulted the text and history of the Amendment. 117 Based on the text, the court
concluded that “bear” means to “carry for . . . confrontation” inside and outside
of the home. 118 Based on the post-ratification history of the Second
Amendment, the court determined that the Second Amendment protected the
right to bear arms outside of the home for self-defense. 119 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit concluded the text and history of the Second Amendment confirmed that
it protected a right to armed self-defense outside of the home. 120
Next, like the Supreme Court in Heller, the Peruta court asked whether the
challenged law infringed on the right to bear arms. 121 To determine whether the
statute infringed on the right, the court inquired into whether the statute
burdened or destroyed the right. 122 If the statute destroys the right to bear arms,
then it is unconstitutional. 123 California does not allow open carry and the only
way to bear arms is through a concealed carry permit. 124 Because there was no
other way to carry than to carry concealed arms and because self-defense was
not considered a “good cause,” the Ninth Circuit held that the statute destroyed
the core protection of the Second Amendment. 125 Thus, after this two-step
analysis, the court concluded that San Diego’s practice was unconstitutional. 126

113. See id. at 1153, 1172.
114. Id. at 1179.
115. Id. at 1155 (noting historical “findings” that contradict the Supreme Court’s findings in
Heller are not applicable to determine the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms).
116. Id. at 1150.
117. See id. at 1150–51.
118. Id. at 1151–52 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
119. See id. at 1156–60 (performing a significant historical analysis of “the nineteenth-century
case law interpreting the Second Amendment”).
120. See id. at 1166 (noting its holding conforms with other circuits).
121. Id. at 1167.
122. Id. at 1168.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id. (referring to the statute as a “rationing system”).
126. Id. at 1179.
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2. The Second Approach: A Judicial Reluctance to Decide the Scope of the
Second Amendment’s Application Outside of the Home
The second approach is categorized by an assumption. The federal circuit
courts assume that Second Amendment rights have some application outside of
the home, but the courts do not determine the scope of the right. In Woollard v.
Gallagher, 127 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a
challenge to a Maryland regulatory scheme that required an applicant to
demonstrate a “good and substantial reason . . . to carry . . . a handgun.” 128 The
court, “without . . . demarcating the reach of the Second Amendment,” reversed
the district court’s ruling that the Second Amendment protected a right to carry
a firearm outside of the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 129 The
Fourth Circuit, relying upon its precedent, stated that it was not necessary for
lower courts to search for the meaning of the Second Amendment. 130 Rather,
the court stated that lower courts should await instructions from the Supreme
Court on the issue. 131
However, the Fourth Circuit assumed, for the sake of argument, that there was
a right to bear arms outside of the home. 132 The Woollard court concluded that
the “good and substantial reason” criterion for a carry permit was permissible
because it did not burden an individual’s right to bear arms for self-defense. 133
The “good and substantial reason” criterion did not burden the right to bear arms
because, as the court held, the state’s interest in public safety outweighed an
individual’s interest in self-defense. 134 Therefore, Second Amendment rights
outside the home may be restricted more than inside the home. 135

127. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013).
128. Id. at 868 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety, § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868. In Woollard, at the district court, the plaintiff, an applicant
for a permit to carry a handgun outside of the home, brought action against the state claiming that
the requirement to demonstrate “good and substantial reason” for the issuance of a carry permit
violated the Second Amendment. Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465–66 (D. Md.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
422 (2013). The district court decided it had to determine whether the statute “burden[ed] any
Second Amendment right at all.” Id. at 469. Relying on Heller, the district court stated that the
right for self-defense was strongest inside the home, implying that it existed in a less acute form
outside of the home. Id. Moreover, the district court reasoned that self-defense is an in rem need
wherever a person is located, and, therefore, found that the Second Amendment’s protections
extend beyond the home. Id.
130. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (stating that when examining the scope of the Second
Amendment outside of the home, a previous Fourth Circuit case controls review).
131. Id. at 872.
132. Id. at 876.
133. Id. at 881–82.
134. Id. at 882.
135. Id. at 876.
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In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 136 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit heard a constitutional challenge to a restrictive gun carry permit
scheme. 137 Specifically, the court considered whether a New York statute that
required a showing of “proper cause” to conceal a handgun in public violated
the Second Amendment. 138 Under New York law, to secure a concealed carry
permit for the purpose of self-defense, an applicant needed to demonstrate
“proper cause,” which was defined as “a special need for self-protection
distinguishable from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the
same profession.” 139 The plaintiffs each sought to carry firearms outside of the
home for purposes of self-defense, and all were denied a permit. 140
The Second Circuit emphasized that the Second Amendment protections “are
at their zenith within the home” and cautioned that its implications outside the
home are a “vast ‘terra incognita.’” 141 With no clear direction from the Supreme
Court regarding the Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home, the
Second Circuit assumed that the Second Amendment has “some” application
outside of the home but did not make a conclusive decision one way or the
other. 142 Then, the court distinguished Kachalsky from Heller. 143
Specifically, the Second Circuit said that the distinction between the cases was
the need to promote public safety. 144 The Second Circuit noted that there were
no public safety concerns in Heller because the ban applied to firearms inside
136. 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct.
1806 (2013).
137. Id. at 83.
138. Id. According to the court, under the New York law, in order to qualify for a carry license,
one must have a handgun license. Id. at 83–84. The handgun licenses are restricted to those over
the age of twenty-one who have a good moral character and lack a criminal history or mental illness.
Id. at 86 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a)–(c), (i) (McKinney 2014)). According to the
court, the statute does not supply a definition for “proper cause.” Id. Consequently, New York
courts have determined “proper cause” to include carrying for the purposes of target shooting,
hunting, or self-defense. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Klenosky v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980)).
140. See id. at 83; see also id. at 88 (“Plaintiffs’ applications were all denied for the same
reason: Failure to show any facts demonstrating a need for self-protection distinguishable from that
of the general public.”).
141. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)).
However, the Seventh Circuit later claimed that the “‘vast terra incognita’ has been opened to
judicial exploration by Heller and McDonald.” See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir.
2012). It is the lower courts’ job to explore the limits of the Second Amendment and to
substantively rule on these issues, rather than assume for the sake of argument that a right exists,
because without the courts acting on this the Supreme Court will never be able to give direction to
the lower courts.
142. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.
143. Id. at 94. New York’s scheme concerned carrying handguns in public, while Heller
concerned a ban within the home. See id.
144. See id. (noting public safety usually outweighs the Second Amendment interest in selfdefense).
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the home, while the statute in Kachalsky restricted carrying in public due to
public safety concerns. 145 Thus, in Kachalsky, handgun regulation was a means
to achieve the state’s goal of promoting public safety. 146 The Kachalsky court
concluded that the statute did not infringe on the right to bear arms because the
“proper cause” restriction on carrying handguns was substantially related to New
York’s interest in protecting the public and preventing crime and it promoted
those interests. 147 Therefore, the court noted that this public safety interest
outweighs an individual’s right to bear arms in public. 148
III. DRAKE V. FILKO: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT’S SCOPE OUTSIDE OF THE HOME
A. Majority View: Drake v. Filko
149

In Drake v. Filko, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit weighed
in on the circuit split concerning the Second Amendment’s protections of the
right to bear arms outside of the home. 150 In this case, the appellants were each
denied a New Jersey concealed carry permit because they failed to demonstrate
the statutory prerequisite of a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun for selfdefense in public. 151 The New Jersey statute defined “justifiable need” as a
special need for self-defense apart from the general population. 152
The district court held that the statute was a longstanding restriction
contemplated by Heller and, therefore, did not violate an individual’s right to

145. Id.
146. Id. at 98. The restriction is in the interest of “public safety and crime prevention.” Id.
147. See id. at 98–99 (noting that it was unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny to the statute).
148. Id. at 100.
149. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134
(2014).
150. Id. at 431.
151. Id. at 428–29 (stating that appellants “were denied, however, because pursuant to [N.J.
STAT. ANN.] § 2C:58–4(c) either a police official or superior court judge determined that they failed
to satisfy the ‘justifiable need’ requirement”).
152. Id. at 428 (stating that “justifiable need” means “the urgent necessity for self-protection,
as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the
applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a
handgun” (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:54-24(d)(1) (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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bear arms. 153 The Third Circuit agreed, while recognizing that the Second
Amendment’s application outside of the home was an unsettled issue. 154
The court stated that Heller and McDonald only conferred an individual right
to bear arms inside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense. 155 Although
the court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit in Moore determined
that Heller’s historical analysis implied that the Second Amendment protected a
right outside of the home, the Drake court suggested that the Seventh Circuit
“may have read Heller too broadly.” 156 In doing so, the Third Circuit rejected
the appellants’ argument that a historical analysis was necessary because
“[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one voice.” 157
The court declined to perform a historical analysis of the Second Amendment
and did not decide whether an “individual right to bear arms for the purpose of
self defense extend[ed] beyond the home.” 158 Rather, a determination of the
Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home was “not necessary to
[its] conclusion.” 159 Instead, the Third Circuit continued its analysis by
“[a]ssuming that the Second Amendment individual right to bear arms [did]
apply beyond the home.” 160
Under this assumption, the court questioned whether the “‘justifiable need’
[requirement] to carry a handgun for self-defense burden[ed] conduct within the
scope of that Second Amendment guarantee.” 161 Applying intermediate
153. Id. at 429. In the district court, the plaintiff claimed that there is a fundamental right to
carry a firearm under the Second Amendment. See Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816
(D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom.
Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). The court declined to find such a right outside of the
home because as it understood Heller only protects a right to carry inside the home. Id. at 816.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the historical evidence Heller cited is unclear on whether there is
a right to carry outside of the home. See id. at 824. However, the court assumed that there is a
right to bear arms outside of the home, even though it came to the opposite conclusion that there is
no right outside of the home. See id. at 826 (stating an absolute ban on carrying weapons outside
the home would be unconstitutional). The court then upheld the gun regulation because it passed
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 837.
154. Drake, 724 F.3d at 429–30.
155. See id. at 430 (“Taken together, these cases made clear that ‘Second Amendment
guarantees are at their zenith within the home.’” (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)).
156. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 431 (alteration in original) (quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (rejecting appellants contention that “‘[t]ext, history, tradition and precedent all
confirm that [individuals] enjoy a right to publicly carry arms for their defense’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Appellant’s Brief and Appendix Volume I at 12, Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-1150))).
158. Id. (“At this time, we are not inclined to address this contention by engaging in a round
of full-blown historical analysis, given other courts’ extensive consideration of the history and
tradition of the Second Amendment.”).
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id.
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scrutiny, the court concluded that, according to Heller, “the ‘justifiable need
standard’” to obtain a permit to carry publicly a handgun for self-defense
“qualifie[d] as a ‘longstanding,’ ‘presumptively lawful’ regulation.” 162 In other
words, the requirement for a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun for lawful
self-defense is a proper, longstanding restriction on an individual’s Second
Amendment rights. 163 Therefore, the court concluded that New Jersey’s
“justifiable need” requirement to carry a handgun did not burden the Second
Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home for self-defense, and the
“justifiable need” statutory scheme was constitutional. 164
B. Dissent: The Second Amendment Protects a Right to Carry a Firearm
Outside the Home
The dissent in Drake, however, rejected the majority’s reading of Heller. 165
The dissenting judge stated that the interpretation of the Second Amendment
under Heller and McDonald protected an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of lawful self-defense. 166 Because the Second Amendment
secures the right to bear arms for self-defense, and as the need for self-defense
is arguably greater outside of the home than inside the home, the dissent believed
that the Second Amendment must apply outside of the home. 167 Furthermore,
the dissent noted that Heller and McDonald explained that the Second
Amendment removed certain policy choices from the legislature. 168 Moreover,
New Jersey’s policy choice to restrict the right to bear arms to a “justifiable
need” violated the Second Amendment’s core protection of a right to armed selfdefense. 169 The dissent stated that “interpreting the Second Amendment to
162. Id. at 434.
163. See id. (“[A]ssuming that the Second Amendment confers upon individuals some right to
carry arms outside the home, we would nevertheless conclude that the ‘justifiable need’ standard .
. . is a longstanding regulation that enjoys presumptive constitutionality under the teachings
articulated in Heller . . . .”).
164. See id. at 439–40 (“We refuse Appellants’ invitation to intrude upon the sound judgment
and discretion of the State of New Jersey, and we conclude that the “justifiable need” standard
withstands intermediate scrutiny.”).
165. Id. at 440 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s law conditioning the issuance of a
permit to carry a handgun in public on a showing of ‘justifiable need’ contravenes the Second
Amendment.”).
166. Id. at 444–45 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s historical understanding of an
individual’s right to bear arms protects an individual in both public and private settings).
167. See id. at 445–46 (“[T]he legal principle enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts
presented in that case.”); see also id. at 445 (stating that the Supreme Court declined to apply the
Second Amendment outside of the home, because the case was limited to the facts at issue).
Moreover, the Second Amendment, according to the dissent, applies outside of the home. Id.
168. See id. at 442 (“[T]he question presented is not whether New Jersey’s justifiable need
requirement is a reasonable, let alone a wise, policy choice. Rather, we must decide whether the
New Jersey statute violates the Second Amendment.”).
169. See id. at 444 (“[T]he Heller Court repeatedly noted that the Second Amendment protects
an inherent right to self-defense . . . .”).
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extend outside the home [was] merely a commonsense application of the legal
principle established in Heller and reiterated in McDonald: that ‘the Second
Amendment protect[ed] the right to bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense.’” 170
IV. THE TEXT AND HISTORY DICTATE THAT THE SECOND AMENDMENT
PROTECTS THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS OUTSIDE OF THE HOME
A. The Third Circuit Unpersuasively Assumed the Scope of the Second
Amendment Without Discussing Its Text and History
Historically, the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms “is, and has always
been, an individual right” to armed self-defense. 171 The Supreme Court, in its
discussion of the Second Amendment in Heller, held that the Second
Amendment protected an individual’s right to bear arms for the purpose of selfdefense because of the Amendment’s text and historical origins. 172 The Third
Circuit’s decision in Drake ignored the text and history of the Second
Amendment and arrived at a flawed conclusion.
First, the text of the Second Amendment implies a right to bear arms outside
of the home for self-defense. As interpreted by Heller, the right “to bear
arms” 173 refers to a right to carry for the purpose of confrontation. 174 Confining
the right “to bear arms” to the home, as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits noted, is
nonsensical, improper, and an awkward use of the phrase. 175
Second, if restricted solely to the home, the right “to bear arms” would lose
its intended meaning. 176 The idea of carrying a gun for self-defense “does not
exactly conjure up images of father stuffing a six-shooter in his pajama’s pocket
before heading downstairs to start the morning’s coffee.” 177 Rather, it brings to

170. Id. at 446 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010)).
171. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008)).
172. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; id. at 622 (“This holding is not only consistent with, but
positively suggests, that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms
. . . .”).
173. Id. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”).
174. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). (“[T]he right to ‘bear’ . . . is
unlikely to refer to the home. To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would at all times
have been an awkward usage. A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside
the home.”).
175. See id.; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1152 (“To be sure, the idea of carrying a gun ‘in the clothing
or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready,’ does not exactly conjure up images
of . . . mother concealing a handgun in her coat before stepping outside to retrieve the mail.”
(omission in original)).
176. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“Putting all of the [] textual elements together, we find that
they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”); Moore,
702 F.3d at 936 (“Confrontations are not limited to the home.”).
177. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1152.
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mind the image of a woman carrying a handgun to protect herself on her nightly
jog. 178 Therefore, there seems to be no logical reason solely based on the
language of the Second Amendment to restrict the right of self-defense to the
home, 179 because there is an interest in self-defense outside of the home, as
well. 180
Third, although the Third Circuit stated that history was inconsistent and
“do[es] not speak with one voice” on the right to bear arms, its determination
ignored Heller’s rejection of flawed cases that misinterpreted the Second
Amendment. 181 Rather, history confirms the Second Amendment’s protection
of the right to bear arms outside of the home. As shown, during the
Revolutionary War and the ratification process of the Bill of Rights, the Second
Amendment protected a right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense inside
and outside of the home. 182 The Framers also understood the same when they
drafted the Second Amendment. 183 Because these historical determinations
were integral to Heller’s holding, they must be followed in all Second
Amendment litigation. 184
Moore and Peruta affirm this notion that these historical analyses are central
to Heller’s holding and, even if the courts disagree with them, they are bound to
follow the holding. 185 In other words, without these historical analyses, Heller
could not stand on its own. As the Peruta court noted, “Heller clarifie[d] that
the keeping and bearing of arms [was], and ha[d] always been, an individual
right. . . . [T]he right [was], and ha[d] always been, oriented to the end of selfdefense. Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether propounded in 1791
or just last week, [was in] error.” 186 Thus, the Third Circuit’s reliance on
178. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 937 (explaining that it is more likely for a woman to defend herself
outside of the home than it is for her to need self-defense inside of her home); see also Peruta, 742
F.3d at 1152 (stating that the right to bear arms “brings to mind scenes such as a woman toting a
small handgun in her purse as she walks through a dangerous neighborhood, or a night-shift worker
carrying a handgun in his coat as he travels to and from his job site”).
179. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (noting that the natural meaning of the language
indicates carrying a weapon for self-defense), with Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 (“[O]ne doesn’t have to
be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth
century could not rationally have been limited to the home.”).
180. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 446 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he need
for self-defense naturally exists both outside and inside the home”), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v.
Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). The “object” of self-dense is one’s own person, and this “object”
is not restricted to, or defined by, its position inside or outside the home.
181. Id. at 431 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. See supra Part I.B–C.
183. See HALBROOK, supra note 17, at 310–20 (discussing the Framers’ intent).
184. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The appellees ask us to
repudiate the Court’s historical analysis. That we can’t do.”).
185. See id. at 935 (stating that the court cannot “ignore the implication of the analysis that the
constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one’s home”).
186. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
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nineteenth century cases, which are contrary to Heller’s holding, as evidence
that the history of the Second Amendment “do[es] not speak with one voice,” is
incorrect. 187 These cases were rejected by Heller as misinterpreting the Second
Amendment. 188 Therefore, because the Third Circuit declined to perform a full
historical analysis of the right to bear arms outside of the home, it misunderstood
the history of the Second Amendment and reached an incorrect conclusion.
Furthermore, although the Drake court refrained from addressing the Second
Amendment’s protections outside of the home, its justification for doing so was
weak. The court stated that it would await directions from the Supreme Court
on the issue. 189 However, federal circuit courts could easily explore the scope
of the law. 190 Instead, the court wrongly skirted the issue to await the Supreme
Court’s directions.
As the Drake court, along with the Second and Fourth Circuits, were correct
to point out, Heller noted that the Second Amendment was “most acute” inside
the home. 191 Yet, the Third Circuit ignored the implication of this statement in
its holding. If the Second Amendment’s core protection is “‘most acute’ in the
home,” 192 then it implies that the core protection must also extend beyond the
home. There is no need to assume that the Second Amendment may have some
application outside of the home. 193 Based on the above reasons, the implications
of Heller should have been enough to warrant a full historical analysis of the
Second Amendment’s protections outside of the home.
Although Heller did not “clarify” the entire scope of the Second Amendment,
it provided courts with certain immutable conclusions based on the amendment’s
text and history. 194 The Heller Court concluded that the right was, and always
had been, at its core, an individual right to self-defense. 195 This cannot be
ignored.

187. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
188. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619–23 (2008).
189. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431 (stating that the court will not explain the scope of the Second
Amendment beyond what the Supreme Court has determined it to mean).
190. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is. Tho[s]e who apply the rule
to particular ca[s]es, mu[s]t of nece[ss]ity expound and interpret that rule.”).
191. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (“[T]he prohibition [in this case] extends, moreover, to the home,
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”).
192. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting McDonald v. City of
Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010)).
193. Contra Drake, 724 F.3d at 431.
194. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 937 (“[W]e are bound by the Supreme Court’s historical analysis
because it was central to the Court’s holding in Heller.”).
195. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).
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B. The Third Circuit Wrongly Allowed a Government Interest in Public Safety
to Destroy the Second Amendment’s Core Right to Self-Defense
The core of the Second Amendment is the “inherent right of self-defense” and
because its core protection is implicated in Drake, legislation that destroyed its
core protection would not survive under any level of expressed scrutiny. 196 By
applying intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit wrongly allowed a government
interest to destroy the Second Amendment’s core protection. In New Jersey, the
only way an individual may carry a handgun for self-defense outside of the home
is if he can demonstrate a “justifiable need” to carry a firearm. 197 New Jersey’s
requirement for a “justifiable need” hinges entirely on its interest in public
safety. 198 Because a “justifiable need” constitutes something more than selfdefense, New Jersey’s law destroys the core of the Second Amendment’s
protections. The individual, seeking to bear arms for the lawful purpose of selfdefense, is left with no way to bear arms. Therefore, the statute’s requirements
are unconstitutional.
In addition, as the Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and the dissent in Drake
affirm, the interpretation of the Second Amendment’s right to armed selfdefense is not contingent on casualty data. 199 The Supreme Court in Heller
and McDonald acknowledged and reaffirmed that consideration of public policy
is removed from judicial deliberation because the Second Amendment itself is a
policy choice that guarantees a right to bear arms for self-defense. 200 As a result,
when discussing the Second Amendment’s core protection of bearing arms for
self-defense, certain policy and gun violence arguments shall not be considered.
C. The Third Circuit Improperly Concluded that an Early Twentieth Century
Regulatory Scheme Is the Type of Longstanding and Acceptable Prohibition on
Second Amendment Rights Heller Envisioned
Although Heller approved certain longstanding prohibitions against carrying
guns, these were all well-established before the nineteenth century. 201 The Third

196. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628, 634–35.
197. Drake, 724 F.3d at 428. In addition, by statute, the state has removed the possibility of
openly “carrying handguns in public . . . without first obtaining a permit, and again conditioned the
issuance of such permits on a showing of [justifiable] need.” Id. at 432.
198. Id. at 439 (finding that the core of New Jersey’s “‘justifiable need’ standard” is the
mechanism that “best protect[s] public safety”).
199. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 636)
(“Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to make the right to bear
arms depend on casualty counts.”).
200. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes
certain policy choices off the table.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045
(2010).
201. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (examining Framers-era
sources and concluding that “felons, infants and those of unsound mind may be prohibited from
possessing firearms” without running afoul of the Second Amendment); Kates, supra note 38, at
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Circuit detrimentally relied on Heller’s dicta approval of certain longstanding
prohibitions on the right to bear arms. 202 Yet, the court ignored Heller’s legal
principle. The Drake court claimed that a “justifiable need” requirement was
similar to the longstanding prohibitions approved by Heller. 203 However,
enacted only in 1924, the “justifiable need” restriction does not rest on a 1791
historical foundation and therefore, it is not a longstanding Heller-approved
prohibition. 204
As the Drake court stated, Heller was not intended “‘to clarify the entire field’
of Second Amendment jurisprudence.” 205 The Third Circuit concluded that the
“justifiable need” requirement to carry a handgun was a “longstanding”
However, the “longstanding
prohibition acknowledged by Heller. 206
prohibitions” the Heller Court enumerated were:
[T]he possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 207
Although this was not a comprehensive list, the prohibitions listed concern the
outright prohibition on the use, possession, and purchase of firearms in certain
locations and by people with certain character, behavioral, psychological, or
psychiatric dispositions. 208
These presumptively valid longstanding prohibitions are not substantially the
same as a “justifiable need” to carry a handgun in public. 209 In fact, unlike the
“longstanding prohibitions” mentioned in Heller, the so-called “longstanding”
regulation in Drake was not a prohibition against a certain class of persons or
prohibition from carrying in protected areas. 210 Instead, this “longstanding
prohibition” is not a prohibition at all—it is a predicative and demonstrative

266 (stating that the eighteenth century view that “[f]elons simply did not fall within the benefits
of the common law right to possess arms”).
202. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431–22.
203. Id. at 432; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[T]here will be time enough to expound upon the
historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come
before us.”).
204. Drake, 724 F.3d at 432.
205. Id. at 430–31 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013)).
206. Id. at 431–32.
207. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
208. See id. at 626–27 & n.26.
209. See Amy Hetzner, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual
Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 382 n.165 (2011) (stating that there are presumptively
valid longstanding prohibitions around sensitive areas such as schools); see also Adam Winkler,
Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009)) (“In short, the meaning of the Second
Amendment has changed a lot, but its impact on gun control has not.”).
210. Drake, 724 F.3d at 428–29 (describing a statutory scheme that emphasized all persons
and places).
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legal requirement to exercise the fundamental right of the Second Amendment.
The regulation declared that one must demonstrate that he satisfies the needbased qualification, that is, the person must show that he has a “justifiable need”
for self-defense. 211 This determination by Drake is at odds with Heller’s
conclusion that every American citizen has the right to bear arms for self-defense
under the Second Amendment. 212
V. CONCLUSION
The text, history, and Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment reveal that the Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko, was incorrect by
holding that New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement does not burden the
core of the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear arms. Although
the Supreme Court has yet to determine the “vast terra incognita” of the Second
Amendment’s extra domum scope, the federal district and circuit courts are not
restricted from exploring the unknown. Rather, the history of the Second
Amendment—its English and Constitutional origins—indicate that the Second
Amendment has a general application to bearing arms both inside and outside
the home. The Second Amendment’s rights’ core is related to, and dependent
on, an individual’s inherent and natural right to self-defense.
It is most consistent, with both the historical analysis of the Second
Amendment and Heller’s holding, for the courts to conclude that the Second
Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside of the home for the purpose of
self-defense. Consequently, the courts should strike down a “justifiable need,”
“good cause,” “proper cause,” or “good and substantial reason” to carry in public
unless these requirements are equivocal to the Second Amendment’s core
protection of self-defense. Otherwise, the Second Amendment’s core protection
is destroyed. Furthermore, courts should not address public policy choices
limiting the Second Amendment’s core right to bear arms, because the Second
Amendment preserves the public policy decision made at its ratification, and
only Congress is tasked with altering that decision.
The Drake dissent, Moore and Peruta majorities, and Heller are the most
appropriate approaches to Second Amendment issues today. As shown, these
approaches are consistent with the text of the Second Amendment, its history,
and its meaning as described by the Supreme Court. Drake’s conclusion
demonstrates a desire of the federal circuit courts to skirt the Second
Amendment’s scope, to ignore history, and to fabricate an erroneous solution
that infringes on a legitimate, constitutionally protected right to bear arms for
self-defense.

211. See id. (discussing the application of New Jersey’s “justifiable need” permit requirement).
212. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 595.

